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ABSTRACT 
The new model that we present in this paper is introduced in the context of guaranteed QoS and 
resources management in the inter-domain routing framework. This model, called the stock model, is 
based on a reverse cascade approach and is applied in a distributed context. So transit providers have to 
learn the right capacities to buy and to stock and, therefore learning theory is applied through an 
iterative process. We show that transit providers manage to learn how to strategically choose their 
capacities on each route in order to maximize their benefits, despite the very incomplete information. 
Finally, we provide and analyse some simulation results given by the application of the model in a simple 
case where the model quickly converges to a stable state. 
KEYWORDS 
Learning theory, distributed algorithmic, QoS and Resource Management, inter-domain routing. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the inter-domain network routing, the service Level Agreements (SLAs) correspond to the 
contracts between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and their users for services that ISPs 
provide to their customers. For the Benefit of the ISPs and their users in the inter-domain, the 
concept of SLA has been introduced. These SLAs are characterized by the informations of 
guaranteed QoS and accounting of services. They allow to identify and define customer needs. 
Both QoS-guaranteed services and the accounting cost are critical to the SLA as far as Internet 
services are concerned [10]. A service contract or SLA in the inter-domain, is a bipartite 
agreement between customer and service provider. According to [4] the negotiation between 
both parties (customer and provider) reflects SLS (Service Level Specification) which contains 
a set of technical parameters that define the level of service provided by a domain. Provisioning 
is one of the phases that SLA contains in its life cycle [3] and [4], this phase consists in 
reserving resources and activating the service. In this paper we show how to implement the 
management of resources and inter-domain QoS guaranteed services, while taking into account 
the economic constraints of the various operators in the inter-domain network. For this 
implementation, we have used a new model that we have called stock model. In order to reduce 
the complexity of QoS indicators, we express them by only two parameters corresponding to the 
equivalent bandwidth and transmission delay of traffic. 
In our work, we consider that the customers buy the routes with guaranteed QoS from their 
transit providers. The goal of purchasing a route by an operator is to allow its customers to 
reach a desired service in the destination of this route. The purchase of a route is based on the 
reservation of the  guaranteed temporal capacity on this route, the transmission delay of traffic 
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must be also guaranteed on this route. This temporal capacity is available over a precise period 
of time (eg, a unit of time is one hour), and the transmission delay on this route is defined as the 
sum of transmission delays between each pair of adjacent nodes from the customer until the 
destination. For purchasing a route to a given destination, we consider that each domain in the 
network negotiates with its neighbor (transit provider) the capacity and its availability on this 
route. In this case, the customer asks to its provider for a minimum capacity1 and a maximum 
capacity2, it also asks for a period of availability3 of the capacity asked on this route.  This 
customer must also choose a start time4 of a period asked. Each contract established between 
one customer and its provider for a route to a given destination has the following characteristics: 
the capacity determined by the provider between the minimum capacity and the maximum 
capacity, the period of availability and its start time chosen by the customer, the transmission 
delay of traffic and the price of this route. [2][5][7] and [8] have addressed the comparison with 
usage dependent pricing. After the establishment of this contract, the customer may negotiate 
with its transit provider the decrease or the increase of the purchased capacity. In order to keep 
the same contract with just making a change on the quantity of capacity, this negotiation of 
capacity should remain in the interval between the minimum capacity and the maximum 
capacity initially asked. The main raison for which we have based on this interval of capacity 
for the purchase of a route, is to allow the customer adjustments of capacity on this route to a 
desired service. In a stock model, each route with its source and its destination, corresponds to a 
set of contracts between each pair of neighboring operators (customer and provider) from source 
to destination. An operator that has a route to a given destination must have one single provider, 
but it can have several customers or no customer. The application of this new model is based on 
a reverse cascade approach: each domain in the network negotiates with its neighbor (provider) 
the capacity and its availability on the route to a given destination, for its own traffic and the 
traffic in transit from its neighbors. The negotiations between each two adjacent domains 
(provider and customer) are based on the exchange of communication messages between these 
domains. Each communication between two domains (provider and customer) is initiated by the 
provider that wants to sell capacity on the route with a given destination. Thus this 
communication is characterized by: the offer of this route by the provider, the demand of 
capacity on this route by the customer, the confirmation of sale of capacity by the provider and 
finally the confirmation of purchase of this capacity by the customer. Therefore, in any case if 
an operator is not a destination (service provider), it cannot propose a route with a guarantee of 
QoS if it did not buy previously sufficient capacity on this route. 
In this model, we apply both learning theory and distributed algorithmic. The algorithms 
proposed in the model are used on the various communication steps between the nodes in the 
inter-domain network, and they allow us to determine the characteristics of a route that each 
node wants to sell or to buy. In this study, after the application of this adequate model proposed 
that takes the different dimensions of the problem on some specific scenario, primarily by 
considering the case of one destination and several sources, we focus on its efficiency in the 
inter-domain network and the satisfaction rate of different operators. we focus also on the 
analysis of the stabilizing behavior of the distributed system and the convergence time in the 
case where a model converges to the stable states. 
Some authors [1][13] have considered a cascading connectivity model in the inter-domain 
networks. In [1], both a theoretical game and a distributed algorithmic approach are presented 
for the transit price negotiation problem in the inter-domain routing framework and the authors 
                                               
1
 minimum capacity asked by an operator to its neighbor on a route to a given destination 
2
 maximum capacity asked by an operator to its neighbor on a route to a given destination. 
3
 A period asked by an operator to its neighbor on a route to a given destination. 
4
 beginning of the period of availability of a route asked by a customer to its neighbor. 
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have highlighted situations where cooperation is possible in order to maintain higher prices. In 
this paper, we consider as in [1] that the traffic dedicated to a given destination can be routed 
only through a single provider:  only one path is chosen to each destination. In [13], a cascaded 
connectivity model in the inter-domain network is introduced and analyzed for the 
establishment of SLAs using game theory with realistic rules. This work has shed some light 
over inter-domain routing, the authors have showed that there is a link between SLA cascading 
and the business models of carriers. The difference between the analysis in this work and our 
proposition is that we use a reverse cascade model.  Another difference is that in [13], SLAs are 
established at the end of all negotiations between all domains, while in our case, SLAs are 
established after each negotiation between provider and customers. The impact of this reverse 
cascading model on the structure of the Internet has never been analyzed in detail to our 
knowledge. 
Authors have proposed and used a decentralized learning algorithm in [9]. Considering games 
with incomplete information, this algorithm is introduced in order to reach a Nash Equilibrium. 
Authors have given a proof to ensure that convergence can take place into a Nash equilibrium 
when players follow the learning rule. Similarly to the algorithm taken in [9], an approach has 
also been considered in [6] for the game where players select a number of parallel TCP sessions 
to open. Using game theory and assuming that demand of each service is determined by prices, 
the researchers in [11][12] have studied the revenue management competition in inventory and 
pricing without considering demand overflow. Learning theory is also used In [14] to study the 
game related to distributed discrete power control in wireless networks. Authors have proved 
that the proposed learning algorithms converge only to a point which is a Nash equilibrium in 
[9] and [14]. 
Structure of the paper: Section (2) is dedicated to the description of the model. Before 
describing the stock model and the reverse cascade approach in this section, we first describe 
the inter-domain network and we explain what is a contract between two domains for the 
purchase of route. In section  (3), we present the process of different communication steps 
between neighbors for the purchase of route. After, we present in section (4) the policies applied 
by each node in the model. Finally we present in section  (5) the simulations analysis under one 
only topology and finish by the conclusion in section  (6). 
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
2.1. The network model 
We begin this section by modeling the inter-domain network, we model the network by an 
undirected graph G(V ,E ), where sets V  and E  respectively denote the ASs5 and inter-domain 
links. We consider that the vertices of the graph are weighted by their capacity given by the 
function cap :  V → N * , and their delay given by d :  V → N *. These functions represent 
respectively the maximum quantity of traffic that can pass through node with a guaranteed QoS 
and the time required for sending traffic from node to one of its neighbors. We can separate the 
capacity used by each node v  into three parts (see Fig1): 
 
 
                                               
5
 Autonomous System. We assume in the following of this document that each domain in the 
network has only one single AS. Thus an AS, a domain and an operator correspond all to a node 
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 We assign to each vertex v  of a graph G , a number num(v)   from 1 to n  and we denote by 
ΓG(v )  the set of neighbors of v . We focus on the traffic flow between the nodes of the graph that 
requires a guarantee of QoS. A variable S  represents the stage period on which inputs (graph, 
traffic Matrix) are stable, In such case the traffic will be denoted as M S[v,u] corresponding to 
the traffic to be sent from v  to reach a service of node u  (service provider) at stage S . The 
capacity that node v  wishes to buy at stage S  for its own traffic is easy to compute and is given 
by the expression M S (v) = M S[v,u]
u∈V
∑  ( M S (v) ≤ cap(v)). However, the necessary capacity 
for the traffic coming from other operators and passing through node v  is not directly known by 
this node. We also consider that for each node  v , we have a vector of margins margv   of 
dimension n , where each coordinate margv (u)  of this vector has a discrete value and 
corresponds to the local price per unit charged by node v   for each unit of capacity sold on the 
route with destination u . Again, if this value could vary, it will be denoted as margv
S (u)  in the 
vector margv
S
 at stage S . We consider that the unit price to be paid by the node v   to its 
provider for buying route with destination u   is equal to the sum of margins of all nodes on this 
route from v  to u . 
Finally, we associate to each node v  a constant utility(v), which represents the utility per unit 
of the capacity M S[v,u] purchased by this node v  at stage S  to any destination u . We 
consider that if the cost of route at stage S  is upper than or equal to utility(v), v  will refuse to 
send its own traffic. And we also associate to each node v  a constant max_ delay(v) , which 
represents the maximum time required to transmit packets from the source v  to any destination 
u . We consider that if the delay of the route at each stage S  is upper than max_ delay(v) , 
node v  will refuse to send its own traffic at this stage. 
During the stage S , the inputs of the problems are stable, and the game can model interaction 
between nodes during the negotiation of capacity on the route with a given destination. 
2.2. Contract Definition 
Each SLA between two neighboring ASs corresponds to the bilateral contract for purchasing of 
route to the given destination, this route is purchased by the customer from its provider. This 
contract defines the commitment of each AS to another one, between the two ASs (the provider 
that sells and the customer that buys a route to the given destination). Thus each contract related 
to each route purchased by the customer from its provider has the following characteristics: the 
capacity, the delay, the cost, the availability, the start time and the provider of this route. We 
denote the contract established between a customer v  and its provider for a route with u  as 
 
- cap_IN(v): the capacity of traffic sent by other 
nodes with v  as destination. 
- cap_OUT(v): the capacity used by node v to send 
its own traffic to other destinations. 
- cap_IN_OUT(v): the capacity used by node v  to 
route some traffic from some of its neighbors to other 
ones. 
We note that. 
cap_IN+cap_OUT+cap_IN_OUT(v) ≤cap(v)
 
 
Fig1. The different categories of 
capacity used by node v  
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destination by "Contractprovv,u ,v (u)"; provv,u  is the provider of a route purchased by v , i.e a 
route purchased by v  is charged by the provider provv,u . This contract with its characteristics 
are denoted "Contractprovv,u ,v (u)={possv,u, delayv,u, cos tv,u, # blokv,u, startv,u, provv,u}" . 
This contract indicates that the customer v  has bought to its provider provv,u  a route with u  as 
destination. The characteristics of this route are: the capacity possv,u , the transmission delay 
from v  to u  delayv,u , the unit price cos tv,u , the availability period #blokv,u and the beginning 
time startv,u. 
2.3. Stock Model 
In this model, each AS may sell to its neighbors a part or all the capacity on each of its routes. 
As an AS may sell the route of its own services if it is destination (service provider), it may also 
sell the routes that it has bought to other destinations. An AS cannot sell the route to its 
neighbor, which is its own provider of this route. We have already seen that if  an AS is not a 
destination (service provider), it cannot propose a route with a guarantee of QoS if it did not buy 
previously sufficient capacity on this route. Fig2 shows on more detail how a customer w  can 
buy the capacity from its neighbor v  on the route with u  as destination. 
In the example (Fig2) we assume that before a time ti , the node v  has established with u  a 
contract Contractu,v (u) . This contract indicates that node v  has bought a route with guaranteed 
QoS from its service provider u , so the destination of this route is u . We assume that the 
capacity on this route is possv,u . This capacity possv,u  is available during the period #blokv,u 
that begins at time startv,u. After the purchase of this route, the node v  decides to keep a part of 
the capacity purchased to its own traffic and to sell the rest (the unused capacity bought or free 
capacity). We denote this part of capacity kept to its own traffic local _capv,u. Always in the 
case of this example, to sell the unused capacity that v  has bought, it proposes this capacity to 
                                  
 
 
         
                                           Fig2. The different categories of capacity used by node v  
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its neighbor w . We assume that the offer is interesting for the node w , so this node w  buys a 
capacity possw,u . Then both nodes v  and w  establish a contract Contractv,w (u) for the route 
with guaranteed QoS that w  has bought from v .   
Now, we show in the following example (Fig3) how an AS can reserve capacity on a route to 
destination u  at stage S . This capacity is reserved for itself and also for more than one of 
its neighbors. i.e after purchasing capacity by a node v  from its provider provv,u
S
, the node v  
keeps a part local_capv,u
S
 to its own traffic, then it resells to its own neighbors the maximum 
that it can of remaining capacity on this route. In this example, v  resells for each one of its 
neighbors x , y  and z  respectively the capacities possx,u
S
, possy,u
S
 and possz,u
S
. These 
capacities are available respectively during the periods #blokx,uS , #bloky,u
S
 and #blokz,uS . Each 
of these last ones has its beginning time, respectively startx,u
S
, starty,u
S
 and startz,u
S
. The white 
portion in the figure is the available capacity during one block of time that node v can not 
resell, because none of its neighbors has asked for this capacity. 
 
Considering just the nodes x and v in (Fig3), we show the information exchanged at each 
time during the stage S between these nodes before the establishment of contract 
Contractv,x
S (u) . We assume that node v  has established Contractprovv,u ,vS (u)  before a time ti . 
Firstly at time ti , the node v  sends to its neighbors a message in the form of an offer of 
             
 
         
                    Fig3. The capacity and its availability purchased by each node v, x, y and z on the 
route with u as destination at stage S 
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available capacity on its route with u  as destination. Secondly at time ti+1, the node x  sends to 
v  a message asking for capacity between minimal capacity cap_ minx,u
S
 and maximal capacity 
cap_maxx,u
S
. In this message, node x  must choose the availability period #blokx,u
S
 and the 
start time startx,u
S
 of this capacity asked. Thirdly at time ti+2, node v  sends a positive or a 
negative response to x . In the case of this example, it sends a positive response and it must 
define the capacity that it can sell to this neighbor x . The capacity according to x  is possx,u
S
 
and should be given between cap_minx,u
S
 and cap_maxx,u
S
. And finally at time ti+3, node x  
sends a confirmation response to v , this response may be positive or negative. In this example, 
x  sends to v  a positive response and both nodes establish a contract Contractv,x
S (u) . 
After the establishment of this contract, node x  can negotiate with its transit provider v  the 
decrease or the increase of the capacity purchased. In order to keep the same contract with just 
making a change on the quantity of capacity, this negotiation of capacity should be in the 
interval between the minimum capacity and the maximum capacity. i.e. if the customer wants 
just change the quantity of capacity purchased on this route, it cannot asks to its provider for 
more than the maximum capacity or for unless than the minimum capacity already asked. In the 
case where node x  negotiates to reduce its capacity, two cases may occur: if the negotiation is 
done before start time startx,u
S
, node x  can reduce its capacity without paying the capacity 
dropped on this route. this capacity dropped is the capacity unused by x , so node x  must give 
back this capacity unused to v . If the negotiation is done after start time startx,u
S
 and during the 
availability period #blokx,u
S
, node x  can reduce its capacity but it must pay a penalty that its 
provider requires. To understand this exchange of information the general case, we will detail it 
in the section: Communication steps between neighbors in the model. 
Now, we show the process of reservation of capacity by the nodes on the routes to a given 
destination using a reverse cascade approach. During the stage S , the inputs of the problem 
are stable and each As that wants sell capacity on its route it announces this route to its 
neighbors with the corresponding characteristics. When an As decides to buy a route with 
guaranteed QoS from its neighbor, it can itself announces its route to its own neighbors with the 
new characteristics. In (Fig4), the destination node u  offers a route to its neighbors and then 
selects a set of customers (v,y,s), these customers do the same with their own customers ( v  
offers to w , y  offers to w,z  and s offers to z ), and so on until the moment when there is not 
the offer of capacity on the routes towards the destination u . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
                    Fig4. Reservation of capacity by the operators on the routes to destination 
u
 using a reverse cascade approach 
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We have already seen that each SLA corresponds to the bilateral contract between the customer 
and its provider for purchasing route to the given destination (the destination is u in this 
example). These SLAs are established just after the several steps of communication between 
each two neighboring operators. Considering just the nodes x, w, v and u in (Fig4), the figure 
(Fig5) shows the running order of offer queries, demand queries and confirmation queries 
between these operators for the acquisition of capacity. For example, before that the node v 
establishes contract with the service provider u, it cannot offer capacity to its neighbot w on 
the route with u as destination. A contract between two domains for the purchase of route is 
always preceded by negotiation between these nodes, this negociation is based on the 
communication messages that we have mentioned earlier. 
 
In this model, the domain that buys route to the given destination will have either positive or 
negative benefit. Among the causes of negative benefits we can cite: 1) The domain that has 
bought too much capacity and it has not managed to resell this capacity to its neighbors. 2) The 
domain that has not bought enough capacity in order to satisfy the demands of its neighbors. 
These consequences are due to competition between domains, but also in the fact that in this 
model each transit domain buys capacity in blind. I.e. each domain that wants to purchase 
capacity on the route to the given destination, this domain does not know the needs of its 
neighbors for this route. Therefore, the introduction of iterative procedures for learning in this 
model is justified and motivated. 
Thus, using this iterative procedures, the problem that faces each domain consists: in the case 
where this domain is in competition with other domains for purchasing route to the given 
destination, how to fix the interval of capacity and its period of availability in order to be chosen 
for purchasing this route. In the case where this domain is in competition with other domains for 
selling route to the given destination, how to fix its transit price and how much capacity to 
assign to each neighbor in order to be chosen to route the traffic of the greatest possible number 
of neighbors that maximize its profit. 
In this model, we have seen that the negotiation follows a reverse cascade approach from the 
destination backward to the source, where each domain in the path plays both the customer and 
the provider role. The objective of each domain at each new stage is clearly to maximize its own 
benefit with using the informations of the previous stage. In order that each domain maximizes 
its profit corresponding to the given route, it propose attractive capacities with attractive transit 
prices, but also by choosing itself the transit providers that offer the routes with a lot of 
capacities and with the lowest prices. Therefore, each domain must evolve some parameters on 
this route (price, capacity, delay, availability). This model converges to the stable state when 
each domain in the network has not interest to deviate from its chosen strategy, so the stable 
             
 
     Fig5. The order of queries in time 
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state corresponds to NE (Nash Equilibrium). In the cases where this model converges to the 
stable state, the satisfaction rate is interesting if an important number of domains in the network 
are satisfied. 
3. COMMUNICATION STEPS BETWEEN NEIGHBORS IN THE MODEL 
3.1. The offer step 
The providers announce the characteristics of their own services if they are destinations 
(services providers), else they announce  the characteristics of routes they have bought 
(capacity, delay, price, destination and availability) to their neighbors which are not their own 
providers. The offer of capacity on the route to destination u  is always initiated by the 
destination node u  (service provider), and this node must have at least one service. The 
provider node can initiate this event when it wants sell a capacity on its route. 
At each stage S  and for each destination u , the sextuplet 
"Contract provv,u ,v (u)={poss v,uS , delay v,uS , cos t v,uS , # blok v,uS , start v,uS , prov v,uS }"  indicates that 
the node v  has a route to u  with capacity possv,u
S
 and transmission delay delayv,u
S
. This route 
was sold by the provider provv,u
S ∈ ΓG(v ) for a price cos tv,u
S
 and the number of blocks of time 
#blokv,u
S
 when this route is available. The availability of this route begins at time startv,u
S
. We 
consider that the following properties have to be verified: 
possw,u
S ≤ possv,u
S
, where Custv,u
S
= {w ∈ Γ(v) provw,uS = v}
w∈Custv,u
S
∑  is the set of customers of the 
node v  at step S  for the route to destination u . 
possv,u
S ≤ cap(v)
u∈V
∑  
#blokv,u
S ≤#blok
provv,u
S
,u
S
 
startv,u
S ≥ start
provv,u
S
,u
S
 
#blokv,u
S + startv,u
S ≤#blok
provv,u
S
,u
S + start
provv,u
S
,u
S
 
Initially after the node v  has purchased a route with destination u  at stage S , it keeps a certain 
capacity for its own traffic if it is profitable and sells to its neighbors what it can of the 
The exchange of information 
between the operators follows an 
asynchronous communication 
model with discrete events and 
we distinguish four main events 
according to the role of the 
(provider or customer), as shown 
in Fig6. These events are 
controlled by the operator 
policies that will be defined in 
Model policies section. 
 
Fig6. Communications between provider and customer 
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remainning capacity on this route it has bought. We consider that the following properties have 
to be verified: 
− local _ capv,uS =
M S[v,u] if cos tv,uS < utility(v)
0 if cos tv,uS ≥ utility(v)
 
 
 
  
 
− local _ capv,uS ≤ (possv,uS − possw,uS
w ∈Custv,u
S
∑ )  
Let us remark that at each stage S , the available capacity on the route with u  as destination is: 
free _ capv,uS ≤ possv,uS − (local _ capv,uS + possw,uS
w ∈Custv,u
S
∑ )   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. The demand step 
This event corresponds to the sending of requests by the customer v  to the potential providers, 
these requests are related to ask for buying of a route for a given destination u  by the customer 
v . At stage S , each node v  that wants to buy a route to a destination u  sends a demand query 
"demand_ routev,u
S
"$ to one of its neighbors in the set Ω, that offered this route (see Fig8). 
demand _ routev,uS = {[cap _ minv,uS ,cap_maxv,uS ], #blokv,uS , startv,uS }. 
 
We suppose that a node v  has a route to the destination u  at step 
S , routv,u
S
= {possv,uS ,delayv,uS ,cos tv,uS ,#blokv,uS ,startv,uS , provv,uS }. 
Therefore, the node v  sends an offer request "offer _ routev,uS " to 
each node w  such that w ∈ ΓG(v )  and w ≠ provv,u
S
.  
offer _ route = { free _ capv,uS ,new _ delayv,uS , pricev,uS ,#blokv,uS ,start
such that: 
new _ delayv,uS = delayv,uS + d(v)
pricev,u
S
= cos tv,u
S + margv
S (u)
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Fig7. The offer step 
Fig8. The demand step 
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Ω ∈ ΓG(v ): Set of the neighbors of node v  that offer routes with u  as destination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. The selection step 
                                
The provider chooses its neighbors in order 
to maximize its benefice. Recall that 
Cust v,u
S
= {w1,w2,...,wk}  the set of customers that the provider v  wants to satisfy at stage 
S , the following conditions must be verified: 
Therefore, in this case, each operator v  asks at stage S  to its neighbor p  in the set 
Ω for buying a route with the capacity possv,u
S
 
( cap_minv,uS ≤ possv,uS ≤ cap_ maxv,uS ), for a given period #blokv,uS  and 
destination u , such that  ( # blokv,uS ≤# blokp,uS ) and ( startv,uS ≥ startp,uS ) (See 
Fig9). 
 
Fig9. The capacity in the interval 
[cap_minv,uS ,cap_maxv,uS ] that the operator v asks to its 
neighbor p ∈ Ω on the route with destination u, and for the 
period #blokv,u
S
  
This event is initiated by the provider node v  
as an answer to the requests of ask for route 
with destination u  in the demand step. This 
response may be positive or negative. In case 
of positive answer for a given customer w  that 
has asked to the node v  for the route with 
destination u , the node v  must determine at 
stage S  the capacity on the route with 
destination u  that can be sold to this customer 
w . Therefore, the provider sends to this 
customer w  a message 
"Ok(possw,uS ,#blokw,uS )", 
cap_minw,u
S ≤ possw,u
S ≤ cap_maxw,u
S
. (See 
Fig10). 
Fig10. The selection step 
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possw,u
S ≤ free _ capv,uS
w∈Custv,u
S
∑
cap _minw,u
S ≤ possw,u
S ≤ cap_ maxw,u
S
, ∀w ∈ Custv,uS
#blokw,u
S ≤# blokv,u
S
, ∀w ∈ Custv,uS
startw,u
S ≥ startv,u
S
, ∀w ∈ Custv,uS
startw,u
S +# blokw,u
S ≤ startv,u
S +# blokv,u
S
, ∀w ∈ Custv,uS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The selection of the customers by the provider: 
When the provider node v  receives demands of route to the destination u  by its neighbors in 
the set {w1,w2, ...,w i, ...} , it classifies the nodes that ask for this route according to the 
following criteria: 
1. The greatest benefice that the provider v  can have about the choice of each node wi. 
2. The numbering of nodes num(w i)  in case of equality of benefices, the node v  selects its 
customers in increasing order of their numbers num(w i) . 
And afterward, compared to the free capacity in this route of the provider, it satisfies all or a 
certain number of its neighbors {w1,w2, ...,w i, ...}  by respecting the classification of these 
last ones. 
Determination of benefice that a customer w  can cause to its provider v  at stage S  (A 
benefice of the provider v  about the capacity that it sold to the customer w):  
                                 
Benef v,uS (w) = (# blokw,uS ) * (possw,uS ) * (margv,uS )  
3.4. The choice step 
The choice of the provider by the customer: 
When the customer node v  is selected for the first time by the provider node p1 offering the 
route r1 to the destination u  at stage S  (i.e. it does not already have a route to the destination 
u ), it sends the positive response to this provider p1, so prov v,uS = p1 . 
This event is initiated by the customer node 
as an answer to the positive selection query 
sent by the provider in the selection step. 
This response may be positive or negative 
(see Fig11). Let us note that each node that 
wishes to change of provider for the route 
with destination u , releases its route only 
when it receives a confirmation of sale 
from its new provider. 
 
Fig11. The Choice step 
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And afterward, when the customer is selected during the same stage S  by another provider p2 
for which it demanded the route r2  with the same destination u  (i.e. it does already have the 
route r1 to the destination u  buying by p1, and the availability of this route is not yet begun), 
we propose three solutions that correspond to the three following models: 
a) The open model: If the new route r2  is more interesting than its route r1, the customer v  
releases its route r1 and it sends the positive response to the new provider p2, so 
provv,u
S
= p2 . This model is applied in simulations of our work. 
b) The blocked model: The customer v  that has already chosen its provider p1 cannot release 
its route r1. So, it never sends another demand of route and so it will not be selected again by 
another provider. 
c) The model with penalty: If the new route r2  is more interesting than its route r1. The 
customer v  can release the old route r1 and it sends the positive response to the new provider 
p2 ( provv,u
S
= p2), but the customer v  must pay the penalty that the previous provider p1 
requires. 
 
4. MODEL POLICIES 
In this section, we present the different policies applied by the operators in the stock model. 
4.1. The offer route policy 
This policy allows each provider at each stage S  to define the quantity of capacity available for 
the sale on its routes. We can have two cases for the route with u  as destination:  
1. If the provider node is the destination node, the available capacity that this node offers to its 
neighbors is equal to its free capacity ( free _ capv,vS = possv,vS ) . 
2. If the provider node v  is different from the destination node u , the available capacity that 
this provider node v  offers to its neighbors is the difference between the capacity purchased on 
this route and the capacity that it wants to keep for its own customers 
( free _ capv,uS = possv,uS − local _ capv,uS ). 
4.2. The fixation price policy for an offer of route 
This policy allows to define the price of each route at each stage S . Each provider v  that 
wishes to sell the capacity on its route to destination u , it must apply this policy to fix the price 
of this route. The price that v  must fix on this route is equal to the sum of the price that it has 
bought this route and its margin. So by deduction, the idea in this policy is to fix the margin. 
Two cases can occur in this policy, before presenting these cases, we show how to determine the 
benefice of v  after the purchase and the sale of capacity on route with v  as destination. 
                   
                                 
Benef
v,u
S
= [ (# blokw,uS
w ∈Cust v,u
S
∑ ) * (possw,uS ) * (costw,uS )]
             +[(#blokv,uS ) * (local_capv,uS ) * (utility(v)]
              - [(#blokv,uS ) * (possv,uS ) * (costv,uS )]
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The case where this margin is a constant:  In this case, all nodes choose their margins and 
these margins do not move during time. 
The case where this margin is not a constant: In this case, at the first negotiation stage 
(S = S0) , each node fixes its margin to 1. And afterward, two cases can occur at each stage 
(S /S ≠ S0) :  
1. If the provider node v  has sold all or a part of its capacity bought at the stage (S −1)  and 
that its benefices were positive ( Benef v,uS−1 > 0: the benefices brought by v  for purchasing the 
route with destination u  at stage (S −1) ), so at this stage S  it increases the margin of one unit 
to hope to have more benefices, margv
S (u) = m argvS−1(u) + 1.  
2. If the provider node v  has not sold its capacity bought on this route at the stage (S −1)  and 
( margv
S−1(u) >1). We interpret this case by the fact that the competitors of v  have proposed 
cheaper prices on this route at stage (S −1) . So at this stage S , it decreases the margin of one 
unit to hope to win against its competitors, margv
S (u) = m argvS−1(u) −1.  
4.3. The capacity demand policy 
This policy allows each customer at each stage S  to define the interval of capacity on each 
route that it wants to buy. We have already seen that during the phase of communication at each 
stage S  between two nodes (the provider p  and the customer v ) for purchasing of route with 
destination u , the customer demands the capacity for its route on an interval, such that : 
0 ≤ cap _ minv,u
S ≤ cap _ maxv,u
S ≤ min(cap(v), free _ capp,uS ), this policy allows the 
customer v  how to determine its cap _ minv,u
S
 and  cap _ maxv,u
S
. 
Fixation of cap _ min:  During the first stage (S = S0) , each node v  that wants to ask to its 
neighbor p  for the capacity on the route with destination u , it fixes its minimal capacity  
( cap_ minv,u
S0
= M S0 [v,u]
 if cos tv,u
S0 < utility(v)
 or cap_ minv,u
S0
= 0
 if 
cos tv,u
S0 > utility(v) ). And afterward, several cases can appear at each negotiation step 
(S /S ≠ S0) .  
1. If the node v  has managed to sell its capacity bought at stage (S −1)  and that its benefices 
were positive ( Benef v,uS−1 > 0), so at this stage S  it requires the same minimal capacity that at 
stage (S −1) . cap _ minv,uS = cap _ minv,uS−1. 
2. If the node v  has not managed to sell its capacity bought on this route at stage (S −1) . We 
interpret this case by the fact that v  did not have enough capacity on its route at stage (S −1) , 
i.e. the competitors of v  have proposed more capacity on this route or the neighbors of v  have 
required more capacity than what was proposed by v . So during this stage S , it increases if it 
can the minimal capacity of one unit to hope to have more capacity and to win against its 
competitors, cap _ minv,u
S
= cap_ minv,u
S−1+1. If v  cannot increase its minimal capacity, i.e 
it has demanded the maximum that was offered by its provider at (S −1) . So during this stage 
S
 it asks for cap _ minv,u
S
= M S[v,u]
 if utility(v) > cos tv,uS  or cap _ minv,uS = 0  if 
utility(v) < cos tv,uS  to avoid negative benefice. 
Fixation of cap_max:  At each stage S , each node v  asks for the maximum capacity 
possible that it can. Therefore, it asks for the minimum between the capacity that it can transit 
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and the capacity that has been proposed by its provider. 
cap_ maxv,u
S
= min(capS (v), free _capp,uS ), ∀S . 
4.4. The customers' selection policy by the provider 
This policy defines the order in which the requests of demand of acquisition of capacity are 
served by the provider node v . This policy is used when the capacity required by the customers 
exceeds the capacity available on this route. This policy depends on both quantities 
cap _ minw,u
S
 and cap _ maxw,u
S
. 
At each stage S , each provider v  tries to attribute a minimal capacity required by each of its 
customers wi in the order (cap _ minw1 ≤ cap _ minw2 ≤ ... ≤ cap _ minwi ≤ ...) . And 
afterward, provider v  divides its remaining capacity on the number of customers.  Always by 
respecting the previous same order of the customers, it adds to each of its customers a part of 
this remaining capacity. This part should not exceed the difference between cap_minwi
S
 and 
cap_ maxwi
S
. 
 
5. SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
Our objective here is to study the stabilizing behaviour of the distributed system under the 
capacity adjustment strategy. Simulation is done using C. We consider the topology given in 
(Fig12), vertices of the graph are weighted by their capacity and their transmission delay.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this example, we consider node 6 as destination and transmission delay of traffic from each 
node to its neighbors is fixed to 1 unit. We have chosen capacity of each node as shown in the 
graph in order to have competition between nodes (eg: cap(1) = cap(3)  because node 1 and 
node 3 have a common neighbor node 0, this neighbor will choose the best offer for buying 
route to node 6). We assume that margin of each node associated to this destination is fixed to 1 
unit. The availability period of each route proposed to this destination is fixed to the available 
capacity chosen by the service provider (destination). So each node that wants to buy route to 
this destination chooses the same availability period proposed by its neighbor. Therefore, the 
availability periods ( # blok ) are the same and the beginning time ( start ) are also the same on 
all routes to this destination. The utility that each node fixes in order to buy route is 5, and the 
maximum delay of traffic is 10. Recall that each node that receives an offer of route with the 
price that exceeds its utility, refuses to buy this route. Also each node that receives an offer of 
route with transmission delay that exceeds its maximum delay refuses to buy this route. Thus 
 
 
                                      Fig12. The proposed topology 
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we choose these utilities and these maximum delays for nodes in order that these nodes accept 
offers of route in the most cases. In the traffic matrix, we focus on the necessary capacity of 
each source (each node) to transit its own traffic to node 6. We fix these components to 3, i.e 
M S[v,6] = 3, v ∈ {0,1,2,3,4,5}, ∀ S . 
The figures (Fig13 and Fig14) show the benefit of each node at each stage. We clearly see in 
(Fig13) that node 6 increases its benefit from the first stage to the stage 25, this increase of 
benefit can be interpreted by the fact that all nodes increase their minimum capacities. After the 
stage 25, the benefit of node 6 is reduced because some nodes cannot obtain their required 
capacities. ie, nodes that ask for a lot of capacity can not manage to resell all this capacity, and 
the destination node has not obtained benefit about the capacity given back by these nodes. In 
(Fig14), the variation in benefits shows that there is a competition between nodes, (eg, 
competition between nodes 1 and 3, the node that will sell route to node 0 is the node that buys 
more capacity from node 6. In general, the cause of this change is the change of the minimum 
capacity asked by each node. At stage 36, all nodes cannot increase their minimum capacities in 
order to hope for more profits. So at this stage, each node asks for minimum capacity that what 
it has sold at the previous stage. So at the next stages no node has interest to deviate from its 
strategy (minimum capacity asked), and the stable state is reached at stage 36.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
The figures (Fig15 and Fig16) show the minimum capacity asked by each node at each stage. 
Each node increases its minimum capacity if it can in order to hope sell routes to its neighbors. 
Between stages 24 and 25, node 2 decreases its minimum capacity to 0 because the offers that it 
has received are not satisfactory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Fig13. The benefits of nodes 0, 2 and 6             Fig14. The benefits of nodes 1, 3, 4 and 5  
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The figures (Fig17 and Fig18) show at each stage the different capacities of nodes 1 and 3 
related to route with node 6 as destination: The minimum capacity asked by this node, its 
maximum capacity asked, its bought capacity and its used capacity. Recall that the bought 
capacity by each node is not necessarily used. Our choice is based on both nodes 1 and 3 
because they are in competition, and both of nodes want to have the greatest possible number of 
customers. When the maximum capacity asked by the node (1/or 3) is less than 25, it means that 
this node has lost against its competitor (3/ or 1) the purchase of more capacity to node 6. Thus 
this node has asked for this capacity to another of its neighbors that offered a route to 
destination 6.  
 
The figure (Fig19) show the different routes obtained from each node in the proposed topology 
to reach the service desired in the destination node (node 6). These routes are obtained by our 
simulator at the stable state. In this topology, the satisfaction rate of nodes is (100%), i.e. all 
nodes are satisfied. 
 
         Fig15. The minimum capacity asked by 
transit providers 0, 1 and 3 
 
                   Fig16. The minimum capacity asked by 
transit providers 2, 4 and 5  
 
         Fig17. The capacities asked, bought and 
used by node 1 
 
                   Fig18. The capacities asked, bought and 
used by node 3 
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5. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a new model for the QoS and resource management in the interdomain 
routing framework that we have called stock model. This model is presented using a reverse 
cascade approach and an iterative process where nodes could learn the right quantities of 
capacity to buy and stock. The simple simulation results we have presented validate this model. 
They show that in case of simple network topologies and/or basic strategies, the model 
converges towards good and satisfying situations. Moreover, since the model converges to 
positive values of minimum capacities ( cap_ min) it doesn't disadvantage providers. But 
customers are not even more disadvantaged as they can purchase positive stocks of capacity. 
Therefore, this model really constitutes a stock model that urges on nodes to anticipate the stock 
of resources that they will be able to resell. However, in cases of more complex network 
topologies or scenarios (for instance with several destinations), this model would need to be 
reinforced with more sophisticated features and policies. 
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